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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~ABBIID

C. SORENSEN,

Plaintiff and Appellant

Case No.
11013

vs.
R. ~!ORGAN SORENSEN,
Defendant and Respondent

RESPO,NDENT'S BRIEF
NATURBJ OF THE CASE
'l'his is an appeal from an order reducing alimony
from $1,250.00 per month to $1,000.00 per month. The
Dren·c of Divorce was entered on May 29, 1962. The
or1kr reducing alimony was entered on August 11, 1967.
l'laintift'-appella11t will herein be called "plaintiff", and
d('lc1Hla11t-respondent will herein be called "defendant."

DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
'l'rial court found there to have been changes m
lhP ('in·mnstances of the parties justifying reduction in
;1lin1011~· and entered its order accordingly on August 11,
I %1.

1

S'l1 A TE:!\IENT OF FACTS
Because the transcript from the original trial ha,,
lieen lost, counsel are at some disadvantage in Rnpporting, by reference to the record, stakments with referencr·
to the financial circumstances of the parties as of th~
date ( l\Iay 29, 1962) the decree herein was enten·d.
Certain of the exhibits reveal, however, what C'ircurnstances, presumably established by the evidence, were
0mphasized to the court in the original presentation.
Exhibit 4 (of the exhibits rec0ind in the origirrni
proceeding) is a summary of the facts plaintiff urgril
the Court to consider in fixing attorney's feeR as \\'<•11
as in deciding the cans<.> . .Among the facts emphasize<l
in that summary are these:
1. '' l\Ir. Sorensen disclaims anything but a moral
obligation on a voluntary basis with respect to
Christine, who still lives with her mother whilr
attending the University and who is unmarried"
(Item 11, page 4)
2. "One of the novel f ea tu res of the case is a
plan of orderly liquidation of the assets with
high intrinsic values hut not readily marketahle''
(Item 13, second paragraph).
3. ''Early in the controversy the clcfenda11l
stopp<.>d plaintiff's credit with former trade Hl'·
counts including the ::-;ervices of :!\Ir. Don An<lru~,
the gardner, and K<.>nt Anderson the hawly mn11
l\f rs. SorenRen re-employed l\Ir. A ndrns for work
a round the home and the adjoining aereagP, hor
rowing monev for that purpose, she heing incapable of i;erformi11g the w:eessary physical
labor in the premis('S." (Item 13, first parngraph.)

It is evident that, in the i11itial presentation of the
c:1-.:e to the trial court, the court's attention was par1icnlarly drawn to the facts that Christine was unmarried and living with her mother, that she was at(t·nding the University (which everyone knows involves
,jgllificant cash outlay) and that support money was
not being awarded for Christine because she was
l'ig-litl'e11. Further, stress was laid upon the "novel"
i'i renru;.;( ance that the bulk of the property awarded to
plaiHtiff liad "high intrinsic value" but was "not
n·adily marketable" and, far from being a reliable
~1;im·e of iueome, had to be maintained at considerable
11(•! l'\:pPnse so that "liquidation" was a problem.

In these regards, the circumstances of the plaintiff
lrnd, lJ~~ thl' time of hearing on the Petition for l\fodification, completely changed. Christine was then married,
was 110 longer living with the plaintiff and was in fact
<·mployed hy defendant (Record 61, 62). The prop' rt,1 .\[ r. .A11drus was hired to maintain had been
sold ( Heconl 60). Thus the property awarded to
plaintiff which had heen, at the time the decree was
L·11 tt>red, pro<luctive of net expense was converted to a
form pn'sumably productive of net income.
f ,et us now consider the defendant's circumstances

\Vhen the decree was
f'11il'n·d, defendant was, in effect, single. He was receivi11g, the court found, income of $45,000.00 per year as
:i re;.;nJt of 11is personal services.
This finding of the
trial eomt (J1'inding No. 7, Record page 13) was made
111 t lie f<H'l' of unco11 tro,·ertecl evidence that the income

Hild

l1ow they have changed.
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n•porkd hy defendant's employPr as wages ntri<>d fruni
$;')2,8~)8.00 to $;>D,3G0.00 ( ~~xhibits :1 and 10 from origi11al
}ll'Oce<>ding.) The trial court recognized that the l'l'
maimk•r (,.a ryi ng from $1:i,OOO to $20,000) of <ll•fornln nt 's so reported i11comp \Yas in the nature of return 011
tl11• im·pstment represented h;- dl'fernlant 's capital stor·k.
There is 110 e\·idence i11 the reeorcl relating to tl11·
petition for modification which would support a r·011
tention that plaintiff's personal sen·ices ha n~ lwcomp
more ,·aluable to his employer since 19G2. On the r·o11trary, the record (Pl 's. Exhihits 1 and 2, Tnrnscript
P. 54) confirms that defendant and his employer recognize that defendant must sooner or later re<l11('C tli1'
quantum of time and c•nergy lw deYotes to the lrnsim·:-o~
aml mak0 some preparation for retirement. Accordingly, assistance has been proYiclecl and defcll(la11t's
sa1ary appropriately reduced. It is true that <ldl'Jl(lant \
_qross income has not yet l>cen significantly affected, hut
his real income has been and, as we will suhs0quc11tl~
urge as POI XT III of our Argunwnt, clefendm1t ',;
return from investment of his share of the marital esta(1·
is not material to the presr•nt i11quiry.
D0fe]l(la11t's real i11comr), the ii1C'ome really ~n-ailnlil 1 •
for 1wrso11al and family nse, is suhst:rntially red111·L·tl
;-:i11ee 19G2. His testimony (Tnrnscript P. 7:2) is that he
11;.;cti his home• as a eom·enicnt aud attractive P11Yironmcllt in which to display tlH) fumiture h0 st•lls. lt is not
tlie policy of his employer to permit liis use of ~rncli
furniture without charge; he is obliged to huy it. 11 1•

i11cmTed such obligations in connection with the
!11rni,,Jii11g· of his home to he an effectin) sales tool that
11:1~

$:J60.00 per month is tleclucted from his
(lkf's K·d1ibit 4) Defendant and his family

"l'Jlro\:imafrl~,

11<1g(•s.

11.io.\ th<· fnrnishi11gs, of course, hut the elegance is
111<1 i1it a i1wd la rgC' ly for husinC'ss purposes, ancl the exl

J H'lls<·

of tl1at maintenance is properly considered in
<111.\· dett·rmination of defendant's real income. Assot·iat<·d "·ith the expense of maintaining a "display
l1n11s1·" is the expensC' of business entertainment in it.
ll<·n· again, the only testimony is that defendant spends
lrom $200.00 to $250.00 per month for such entertain-

111t·111. l'laiutiff, on the other hand, has no business
11·spo11sil>ilitiC's ren~ale<l by the record. Her alimony
11l11s rd urn from im·estment of hC'r share of the marital
1·~tnll-, i11 excPss of $100,000.00, is a\'ailable for her per~()1ial enjoyment. Further, defendant has heavy travel
~ spe11~ws, 11ot paid by his employer, in performing
:1d<>1p1atel.\· as a director of two national associations
of lll('rel1n11disers. (Transcript 71)
Vi11ally, defendant has remarried and has, in
~1·q1w11c<•, assumed iww responsibilities, financial
otl1l'rwis(', toward a wife and her handicapped
Tl1erp a re frequent occasions, as examination of

conand
son.
De-

t'1·11dn 1tl s F,xhihit :1 will ren'al, when defendant's "net
11<1.\·" th'r month (i11clmli11g amounts recognized by the
11 iul ('OU rt as i11n'stment return) is not enough to pay
1111· nlim011y. If we examine defendant's financial state1111·11ts i11 c·Yide11ee we discoyer that his gross income
:q1p1··1ad1l'S $(i0,000.00 per year. Of that, he has paid,
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under the original clenee, $15,000.00 in alimony, $15,000.00 in income taxes and some $10,000.00 per yt>ar i 11
defraying the expenses we han' diseusse<l.
ARGU:\fENT
POINT I.
THE COURT -WHICH ENTERS A DIVORCE
DECREE HAS CONTINUING JURISDJ(;_
TION TO MODIFY THE DFJCREE IN RESPEC'r TO ALIMONY AND HAS, IN THAT
REGARD, A BROAD DISCRETION.
ThC' legislature has specifically provided (Section
30-3-5 UCA 1953, as amended) that a divorce decree is
suLjeet to ''subsequent changes or 11ew orders'' in regard to distribution of property "as may he reasonable
a11d proper." In this con11ection, this Court has consistently adhered to the universally rewred doctriiw
that the determinatio11 from time to time of the amount
which should he paid as alimony is a matter which r0~ti;
in the sound <liscretion of the trial court. As early as
Read vs. Read, 28 Utah 297, 78 Pae. G7.J, the view WM
c>X]lressed that:
"unless it is made to appear that there Jia,;
lieen an abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in dealing with one or both of these questions, its judgment and orders granting and fixing the alimony ·will not be disturbed.''
This language was quoted with appronll in Blair ,-s.
/]lair, 40 Utah :30G, aud the concept has since be('ll fn·qut>ntly statC'd.
6

It is settled, of course, that the trial court has jurisdidioll to modify a decree hy reducing alimony initially
:1wardPd (:llyas n. Myers, 62 Utah 70; 218 Pac. 123,
;;o ALH 74) and an order modifying a decree in respect
to alimon;· is dearly among the "orders fixing the
<ilimo11~·" to which this Court made reference in Read
\ s. Rl'wl, supra.

Plaintiff eites Ilumiltun n. Hamilton, 89 Utah 554;
.-J8 l'.2<1 11, in support of her contention that, to justify
a Iimon~· modifica tiou, a change in the "conditions or
ci rrnmstances'' of the parties must he shown. We do
not 1p1a rrel with the JI amilto11 holding. Against the backgrnm1d of the many cases construing Section 30-3-5,
!towe\·N, it mu:,;t he recognized that the determination
of wlt0ther circumstances have so changed as to justify
alirnoH~· modification is a matter which rests in the
som111 discretion of the trial court. The appellant must
d<·mo11strate au abuse of discretion. (See Sections 674,
fi/:J on Dirnrce, 24 Am .•Tur. 2nd 793.
POINT II.
TIIE l\IERE FACT THAT THE CHANGES
IN HIS FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ON
\YIIICH DEFENDANT RELIES ARE THE
IU~SULT OF POLICY DECISIONS IN THE
:\lAKli'\G OF 'WHICH HE PARTICIPATED
l J01'~S NOT DISQUALIFY HIS PETITION.
l'laintiff asserts, i11 her argument, that defendant's
'<1l:ny refluctiou was a ",·oluntary act" and that his
i1wn,asPd business expenditures "can he deducted" and,
i11 l'nt'1t tially, \\'Ould be deducted except for lack of orcli7

nary lmsilleSR al'ume11 on the 1rnrt of <h•femlant or ]ij,
Pmployer.
In this eom1edioll, we would point out to thP comt
that thr only evidenee in this record is that, in order (o
produce the $45,000.00 per year which the trial comt
found to be his wages ( Rt>eord, page 2) <lefrndant, wl111
is now 55 years old (Record page 73), has devoted at
least 60 hours per week to the verformance of his myriad
duties with South East Fumiture Company. Begim1ing
at page 53 of the Record, defendant tells of his lmsi11r.'.'
responsibilities. At page 54, we find this testimony:

Q. How much time do you spend rach week in
the performance of these employment ohligatiom
that you have described?
A. Well, certainly not Jess than 60 hours, sometime considerably more than that.

Q. ·what have you done in the last year or f:O
with reference to getting some relief from thi'
work load?
A. ·well, we have been trying the last, oh, yenr
or so, to take some of the prrssure off, lwcanse
the work load, because of complications and the
l'Omplexities of our husiness - we have hre11
tr~'ing to take some of the \YOrk load off, hy distributing some of the detail work that I hare
heen doing, to other people.

It is umloubtedly the law that a defendant nmlrr 8
duty to pay alimony may not avoitl that duty hy sirnply
refu.si11g to produce income. Converse!~-, the Jaw drn·'
not require that ineome at a level whieh will permit
alimoll)' paymPnt be maintaillC'<l by an effort greatly iu
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of the norm aucl one which must jeapordize health.
Tlw plaintiff cannot i·easonably insist that the clef enclaiit, now f>;) years of age, work indefinitely on a 60 hour
wel·ld;' schedule so that she, who has not engaged in
prodncti\'e employment since her marriage, may enjoy
;111 i1l<'ome which, assumi11g a 3% return on the value of
her share of the marital estate, exceeds the GO"\'ernor's

i>x<·ess

~alary.

'rhe record does not support plaintiff's contention
I hat defernlm1t 's salary reduction "\Vas \'Oluntary. It was
aeceptcd in recognition, by the tlirectors of South East
Fnrnitnre Company, that there are physical limitations
011 the perso11al serYices which defendant can contribute.
Plaintiff asserts that this Court can judicially
not iC't' the de<luctibility of the traYel, entertainment and
adnrtising expenses which defendant has incurred but
whieh 11eitl1er he nor his employer has treated as de<lnrtihlc>. EYCn if the concept of judicial knowledge
<'onlcl he so stretched (a proposition for which plaintiff l'ites 110 authority), we submit that South East's
d<·dudion of these expenses, as the alternatiYe to paying
ddenda11t the money to defray them, would reduce defc·nda nt 's income by their amount. The enlargement of
tliP::.;e expenses, deducted or not, constitutes a change
in d<'i'P11da11t 's financial circumstances.

9

POIN'l' III.
DEFENDANT'S INCO~lE ATTRIBUTABLE
TO TNVJ<~ST:\Il<~NT OF THE SHARE OF
THE l\IARITAL ~STAT~ AWARDED TO
HI1\I SHOULD NOT BI1J CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING -WHETHJ<~R CHANGES IN
INCO~IE HA VE OCCURRIDD.
'11 hl' trial court found in thP initial proceeding that
$43,000.00 per year of t hP total defemlan t recei vecl from
South East Furniture \Yas for sen·ices, the remaiud1•r
was return 011 the i1w0stmeut rPpresented hy his common stock. That findi11g is res-juclicata. Plaintiff eontinues to emphasizr, ltowe,·er, that, p\·en though defo11dnnt 's salary has clecrease(1 hy $6,000.00 per year, tht
amounts hr recein's by reason of his stock ownrrship
havr increased to keep pacl>.
\\Te would be <lisposed to corn·rtll' the relcYanc.\ of
fluctuations in dd0ndant 's im·estmPnt income

if

plai11-

tiff and the eonrt has been amenable to the reecipt of
cYidene<' about plaintiff's incomr from inYestment of
her sharr of the marital estate. The follo\\·ing i,; a
resume of the property <:nrnrded plaintiff hy the trial
court as the rPsume appeared in cl<'fcm1m1t 's brief ou
nppeal from the original decrc·e (refcrenees are to the
oriiriJ1al
rt'<·orcl which is now lost):
....,

'l'lic> equit)' in the duplex, \\-hich had an
undisputed Yalue of $24,000.00 and a
debt of $8,98:1.88 __________ ., __________________ ., ____ $15,0lG.1~
Th(• triplex, wl1id1 lrnd a11 urn1ispu1ed
ndne of $;~/,:J00.00, und n drht of
$8,977.l!l --- ------ ---------------- - ---- -- ___________ $18,:J2~.Sl

10

An m1clivifled one-half interest in the
Holladay property, ·with the appellant being ordered to assume and pay
lioth the back taxes and the balance
of the mortgage on the home, so that
the wife would get one-half of the
gross value ---------------------------------------------- 67,500.00
Country Club l\Iembership. (This had a
gross value of $6,000, according to
him, (R. 175) and $7,200 to $7,500, according to her, (R. 114) but he was
ordered to pay the transfer fees,
which she thought would be $3,000
( R. 114) --------------------------------------------------

6,000.00

Cash surrender value of $50,000.00 New
York Life Insurance Co. policy _________ _ 4,050.00
The Antiques

600.00
Total ________________________________ $111,688.93

"In addition the plaintiff was awarded misrellaneous items of personal property which
wrre not separately valued (R. 47) and all of
the furniture and fixtures in the duplex and
triplex which were not separately valued (R. 45).

Using the same values as noted above to
arrin at the gross value of the total marital
estate, as the same is listed on pages 4-7 of this
lirief, the estate (without the 8,000 shares of inhrrited stock) and a value of $210,074.67, so that
on these values, the wife received approximately
.)3 per cent of the marital estate.
1f the large house and property in Holladay
has a ntlue of $187,000.00, then since she received
one-half thereof, ( R. 46), the total awarded to
her would be incrrased by $26,000.00 to $137,fi88.9:1, and the gross value of the marital estate
would he increased to $262,074.00. Under these
11

,-alnes, she would have 1·Pet•in'<l approximatch
:i(i per cent of the total marital estat<>. The mattc.'r
is ma<le PYen more disproportionate hy the faf't
that clefornlm1t llaid $7,000.00 for plaintiff's attornPy and also hacl his own attorney to pay
(H. 48)."
Pl ai11 tiff had then, when the denee was entered,
assets ,-alned at roughly $123,000.00 the bulk of whicl1
\H'l'<'

11011

(.F~xl1ihit

prnductivP and, as she nrgtwd to the eonrt
4 of the exhibits from the orig'inal proccedi11g)

ex1w11sin• to maintain so that a part of her alimony \\a~
cliYertecl to their maintenanC'e.
Defomlm1t testified (Record G9) that the 11011 pro
ductiYP property has been solcl. Defenclm1t offen'd to
pron that plaintiff has recein•cl her share of the sale
proceeds in cash (Record 70). Plaintiff ohj<'cted to tlH·
i11troduction of such evidc11ee

011

the grounds of its im-

materiality (Record 69), and the court sustained tlte
objection (Record 70). Plaintiff cam10t equitahl)· h1·
heard to say that changes in defonclant 's im-estment
income are material but changes i11 hN im-estment income are not.

Tt is p<'rfectly clear that defendant's salary

(<l>

distinguished from innstment income) from South ~nsl
l1as lwe11 reduced h)· $G,OOO.OO pt>r year since the d0erel'.
'rhe $;)00.00 per m011th proYidc<l for i11 I•;xJ1ihits D-1 and
D-2 is 11ot t'011trib11i<•d b)- stockholders, it is dPdnded
from clefernlant 's salan-.
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POINT IV.
WHEN THE INCOME TO BE DIVIDED
AMONG HUSBAND AND WIFE IS LARGE,
THE HUSBAND'S ~IORAL OBLIGATIONS
TOWARD OTHERS ~IAY BE CONSIDERED
IN DETI<~Rl\IINING WHETHER MODIFICATION IN RI•~SPECT TO ALIMONY IS
PROPER EVEN THOUGH SUCH OBLIGATIONS MAY NOT BE RELEVANT WHERE
THE ORIGINALLY AWARDED ALIMONY
PROVIDES ONLY A MINIMUM DECENT
SUBSISTENCE FOR THE "WIFE.
One significant change which has occurred m defendant's situation since the divorce decree is his remarriage. He has assumed responsibilities not only to
his present wife h1t also to her two children, particularly
11 ,;011 afflicted with cerebral paralysis.
To provide
\\'holesome activity for this child, who finds it more
nml more difficult to relate with his contemporaries,
1·laliorate outings are planned. The boy especially en.io~·s boating, and defendant has purchased a boat, at
eo11siderahle expense, so that this source of pleasure
for the hoy can he afforded him. (Record 59, 60)
Plaintiff discounts defendant's new role as a basis
for alimony modification hecause it was voluntarily
a"snmed. No authority is cited for plaintiff's proposition that a change in situation must have occurred
<ig-aiust the "·ill of the husband in order to constitute
t;romHls for modification. There are, as this Court
knows, text statements generally to the effect that relllarriage is a questionable basis for alimony modifica1ion. ·writers (e.g. Section 689 of the American Juris-
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prudence treatise, 24- Am. J ur. 2d 804) say rc'ma niag1
is not good grounds in "onli11arv" ('ases bnt call attP11
tion to cases where the hushand 's remarriage has hee11
taken into account in readjusting alimo11y.
This Court in Ham1d<m vs. Ilnmpto11, 86 Utah Gill.
had before it the pditiou of a cli,·orced husbaucl fnr
alimony reduction where the changes in circumstance>
included hi8 rem<Hriage. Sixt~· dollars per month liar]
initially heen awarded for alimo11~· and support of om
child by the first marriage. Clearly, the first wife and
her child were living near the minimum subsistence leH!
on that award. In reducing the alimony ancl support
obligation eveu more than the trial court rccluce<l it,
the court said this:

"\¥ e are convinced that the chang<> cl conditiom

appearing in the record require a re(1uction i11
the amount of alimony as fixed by the trial court
which we feel is more than the defendant is ahl1·
to pay and at tlw same time maintain his station
in life as a teacher and support his prese11f
fami1zJ." (Our emplwsis added)
\Ve do not prekrnl ot lier changes in circnmstancc,
in the Jlampto11 cE~se \\·er0 not of gr0akr imporh111c·1·
than the divorced husband's remarriage>. \Y<> cite tltl'
casP as n judicial recognition of the fad that a <fo·orct>il
m~111 is s1ill a person, :rnd lie may form 11P\Y rrlationslii]l'
which are not meretri('ions or inimical to soei<{,· lini
which soeiet~· c'11co11rages and \\·ill PlHl('<ffor to prntcd
The lll'\\' famil)· \nt;.; unquestionably a strong faetor i11flne11ei11g tltv ( 'onrt eren in a (•as<> where the initial
inrnrcl nffonll•d :1 lrnn• sulisiste1J('<' to th<> first familY.
14

Similarly in Knighton vs. Knighton, 15 Utah 2d 55,
'l87 P.~d !H, the Court had to divide a monthly income
1il ;;omc $:165.00 (reduced from $495.00) between two
families. The solution upheld by this Court was the
elimination of the $75.00 per month alimony for a period
of a<ljustment after which alimony was restored to
~:i0.00 per month.
The extraordiuary cases, cases where the husband's
n·marriage is considered a solid ground for alimony
rccluction, are of a kind this court infrequently sees. The
family relations courts in this state are usually confr011ted with a situation where an income which is
sC"arcely sufficient to supply the basic needs of one
domestic establishment must be allocated to supply the
J'(•quircmcnts of two. The major concern is to establish
for the plaintiff a foundation for survival in decency.
Courts simply refuse to undermine that foundation on
n showing that the husband has subsequently developed
"moral'' but not legally enforceable obligations.

Iii the instant case, plaintiff was awarded some
;~l :23,000.00 by way of property settlement and, if our
l'<'sParch is adequate, the highest alimony in Utah's
l1istory. Plaintiff has receiYed oYer $80,000.00 from
dvfc·nda11t since the decree was entered. She need have
1 nnr·t>r11, financially, for no one but herself.
Defendant's
position is that, where the income to be divided is large,
it i;.; P11tirely proper for the court to consider the income
J rodncer 's moral obligations on a petition for alimony
''(•adjnstmPut am! to provide opportunity for their
'H(i-.;fnction.
1

15

There are no Utah cases whieh speeifieall.'· annouw·1
this doctrine; there are none we fill(l 'd1er<> the im·orni·
to be divided is large 0nough to invite its i1wocatio11.
In other jurisdictions, however, tl1e conc0pt is well cstaJ 1•
lished. Here is the American ,Jurisprudence statcmt>nt:
"\Vhere an award of alimony against a husband
having a large income is abon~ the average level
of income, his moral as n·cll as legal obligation.•
in respect of the support of other persons may /;1
considered evr11 though the fact that the obligation is only a moral one may (not) be relevant
if the award invoh·es only a minimum decent
subsistence." (24 Am. Jur. 2nd 796) (Emphasi,
added)
Courts which have considered situations like till'
instant one have been very sensitive to real changes i11
the needs of the parties. A cliYoreed wife ·whose husband
has a large income may be entitled to be maintained i11
luxury, but the Court is always properly cognizant that
other people may develop relationships toward the bn'·
band of a kind which society encourages. They may
therel)y become entitled to ronsideration when the que.'·
tion of how the lrnsharnl 's income should be divided j,
re-examined.
A petition Yer;· similar to defendant's was bcfon
the \Vashington Supreme Court in E>64. In Harris '"'·
Harris, :-389 P.2<1 655, an original alimony decree ol
$1,200.00 1wr month was reduced to $700.00 and later
to $450.00 011 i10 e\·idence pcrccptihk from the report
except the rietit io11<>1"s ks timony that he had renrn rrie 11
and assumed lle\\' responsihilities.

JG

As we have pointed out, there are some months when
drfem1aut 's take home pay will not pay his alimony.
Tnfrequently is there as much left for his new family
of fonr as defendant has paid plaintiff for her exclusive
f'njoyment. We believe the following from Russell vs.
Russrfl, 142 F.2d 753, has application here:
"Cases where the husband's income permits the
alimony award to be higher than average standards of living require present peculiar problems.
In such situations the Court should not make
the award so high as to cause financial difficulties
and personal embarrassment on the part of the
husband which may impair his earning capacity.
E\'en if a husband with a comparatively large
income has wronged his former wife he must,
n<'vertheless, live up to the standards required
hy his job and enjoy reasonable peace of mind."
CONCLUSION
Defendant's income from personal services has been
reduced by $6,000.00 per year. The reduction has ocrnrred in consequence of a policy to permit a diminution
of ch•fendant 's business activity from a sixty hour per
1re0k schedule to one which more nearly accords with
the norm for people approaching retirement age. Plaintiff resists alimony reduction because defendant's return
from investment of his share of the marital estate has
licen increasing as rapidly as his income from other
~onrrl'S has diminished. Nevertheless, plaintiff objects
to the receipt of any evidence about her increase in inr·omc (and elimination of expense) by reason of the
<'Oll\'l'n-::ion of her share of the marital estate to pro-
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ductive asset form. 'l'he trial court, h~wing sustained
plaintiff's objection, properly discounted the evidence
of plaintiff's increased return 011 im·0stme11t. This i~
particularly true since most of the South East stork
(the source of defendant's investment return) ,,·as his
by gift or inlwritance arnl included in the determination
of marital estate against prceedent.
'l'he very judge who entered the decree is the> om
who modified it. He knows to what degree he was i11fluenced by the 1962 argume11ts plaintiff made (ExhiLil
4 of the original proceeding) that Christine was liYing
with her while attending tlw Unin'rsity, and that t!te
Holladay property was a drain on plaintiff's ineorne
rather than an asset contributing to her income.
defendant's remarriage aml his desire to
satisfy new moral obligations are relevant to an inquir)·
of this kind where the income to be diYided is large, and
plaintiff can obviously liYe in real luxury eYen under
the modified decree.
Finall~-,

Respcctfnll>- submitted,
CLYDE, l\fECHAl\I & PRATT
FRANK J. ALLFJN
i3:)1 South Statr Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Resz;onde11f
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